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Abstract:
The rate of growth in bank loans to private households and firms in Germany has
declined substantially since early 2000 and currently stands at virtually zero. In this
article, we analyse whether cyclical factors (“demand-side driven”) or banks’ un-
willingness and/or inability to lend (“supply-side driven”) can be held responsible
for this trend.Our preliminary results suggest that the slowdown in bank loan ex-
pansion is largely driven by a decline in the demand for loans. This result is sup-
ported by taking into account the latest tendency of corporates substituting bank
loans for the issuance of money and capital market instruments. Although it cannot
be ruled out that supply-side restrictions have contributed to the dampening of real
bank loan expansion, to date these factors have played only a minor role.
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JEL Classification: G20, G21
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1. Introduction
There has been growing concern in the financial markets over the stability of the
German banking sector. For some time, German banks have underperformed their
US and continental European peers, but most importantly, German bank lending
to private households and firms has declined substantially and is now virtually
zero. This has given rise to concerns that the German banking sector might restrict
the supply of loans to the private sector, thereby potentially dampening economic
growth and, in addition, causing problems for the European monetary policy.
In this article, we aim to shed some light on the reasons for the slowdown in bank
lending in Germany seen in the recent past.
1 First, we give an overview of the
German bank lending growth rates in the more recent past. Thereafter, we provide
and discuss various issues that might be held responsible for the decline in bank
lending. In this context we take a look at the Eurosystem bank lending survey re-
sults for Germany and German borrowing costs as shown in the euro area wide
interest rate statistics. We then provide the results of our empirical test procedure,
which aims to address the question as to whether the decline in bank lending is
due to supply- and/or demand-side factors. Lastly, we conclude with a summary
and outlook.
2. Bank Lending in Germany
Annual growth rates of German real – that is: inflation adjusted – bank loans ex-
tended to private households and corporates has declined sharply since early
2000 (see Figure 1 (a)). The nominal bank loan supply grew by just 1.3% on aver-
age in the period Q1 01 to Q4 03. In real terms the growth rate was -0.1%. This
compares with an average annual growth rate of 5.4% and 3.5%, respectively, for
the period Q1 92 to Q4 03. Real bank loan growth has now reached its lowest
level since the mid-1970s – the pronounced recession period related to the first oil
price shock.
Figure 1 (b) to (d) show the annual growth rates (in nominal and real terms) of total
German bank lending, bank lending to the private sector and bank lending to the
public sector, respectively, according to ECB data for the period January 1995 to
                                                
1  An earlier version of this article was presented at a workshop at the Kreditanstalt für Wiederauf-
baus (KfW) on 17 October 2003 in Frankfurt. In this context, see also Barclays Capital, Den
deutschen Unternehmen geht der Bankkredit aus, 22 May 2003; Deutsche Bundesbank, The
development of bank lending to the private sector, in: Deutsche Bundesbank Monthly Bulletin,
October 2002, pp. 31-46. Also Sachverständigenrat, Niedriges Kreditwachstum in Deutschland
– ein Risiko, Gutachten 2002/2003, pp. 108 – 118.Polleit: The Slowdown in German Bank Lending – Revisited
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December 2003. The latter reveal also a sharp slowdown in bank lending when
compared to Bundesbank data.
Figure 1: Annual Growth Rates of German Bank Lending (%)
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Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Thomson Financial, ECB; own calculations. For graphs (b) to (d):
ECB data definitions. Real growth rates were calculated by subtracting the annual rise in the con-
sumer price index. For Fig. 1 (a) latest data point available Q4 03, for the rest December 03.Polleit: The Slowdown in German Bank Lending – Revisited
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3. Potential Causes of the Slowdown in Bank Lending
At least three factors could provide a plausible explanation for the slowdown in
German bank lending witnessed in the recent past: (1) the substitution of bank
credit by the issuance of money and capital market instruments; (2) the cyclical
slowdown; and (3) a “credit crunch” or “credit rationing”. In the following we will
take a closer look at each of these factors.
3.1 Substitution of Bank Credit by Money and Capital Market Instruments
The slowdown in German bank lending to the private sector might be due to firms
having substituted bank loans through the issuance of money and capital market
instruments (“structural change in corporate financing”). Figure 2 shows the growth
rates of bank lending to enterprises and corporate issues for the period Q1 81 to
Q2 03. Since 1997, the growth rates of corporate issues have increased markedly
(especially in the period Q3 00 to Q2 01, which should have been strongly influ-
enced by the financing of UMTS-licence purchases and M&A activities). Whereas
corporate issuance growth has remained fairly stable since Q4 01, bank lending
growth has declined considerably since then.































Source: Deutsche Bundesbank; own calculations. For the period Q1 99 to Q4 99, data points were
interpolated (as there was a “break” in the time series of bank loans to enterprises due to statistical
changes in definitions of credit aggregates related to the start of the Third Stage of EMU).Polleit: The Slowdown in German Bank Lending – Revisited
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Figure 3:  Corporate Issues as Proportion of Bank Loans to Corporates Plus 
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Source: Deutsche Bundesbank; own calculations. Bank loans are defined as lending to domestic
enterprises minus lending to employees and other individuals.
Figure 3 shows the ratio of corporate issues to total bank loans to those to non-
banks in Germany from Q1 80 to Q4 03. As implied by Figure 2, since the end of
1997, the ratio has increased strongly from around 0.2% to nearly 4.0% in Q4 03.
It may well be that the impressively growing volume of corporate issues will make
up for the slowdown in bank loan growth.
2 (This will be analysed later, especially
so as the bulk of German corporates does not (yet) have access to money and
capital markets, which would allow them to substitute bank loans through the issu-
ance of debt capital market instruments.)
3.2  Cyclical Slowdown
The pronounced cyclical slowdown in Germany, accompanied by a very strong
decline in investment spending, might have contributed to a decline in bank loan
demand, which, in turn, has translated into lower bank credit growth extended to
the private sector. For instance, firms may have increasingly sought to lower their
debt levels (“deleveraging”) and, at the same time, reduced their net investments.
Also, in view of the poor economic outlook, private households could have in-
creasingly refrained from taking up additional loans to finance real estate, con-
sumer goods, etc.
                                                
2  Note that the total volume of outstanding corporate issues was €52.2bn at the end of July 2003,
whereas the outstanding stock of bank loans extended to nonbanks amounted to €2,240.0bn.Polleit: The Slowdown in German Bank Lending – Revisited
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3.3   “Credit Crunch” vs “Credit Rationing”
The slowdown in German bank lending might also be ascribed to supply-side re-
strictions on the part of commercial banks. An increase in bad loans, low margins
and a heightened degree of risk aversion on the part of banks’ management might
have led to banks refraining from extending additional loans to the private sector.
Such a situation is often described as a “credit crunch“ or “credit rationing”.
3 Al-
though these terms are frequently used interchangeably, the developments they
represent differ substantially in economic terms and deserve a closer look (for
further explanation see the Appendix).
To cut a long story short, Figure 4 shows a simple diagram depicting the supply of
and demand for bank loans as a function of the interest rate. The market clears in
point A, where the interest rate is i0 and the loan volume L0. Taking the market
equilibrium as a point of reference, in a credit crunch banks contract their loan
supply sharply (due to, for instance, an unexpected rise in loan provisions that in-
duces banks to reduce portfolio risk) and, as a consequence, the bank supply
curve moves to the left, with point B marking the new equilibrium. The market
clearing interest rate is i1 – which is higher than the original rate of i0 – whereas the
loan volume declines from L0 to L1.
Under a “credit rationioning”, in contrast, risk-reward considerations on the part of
banks lead to an equilibrium as represented by point C: the loan volume declines,
whereas the interest rate does not rise (it may even fall, as in our example, to i2).
Such a situation might occur when there is an asymmetrical distribution of infor-
mation among the lending banks and their clients which, in turn, leads to “negative
selection”. To analyse whether a credit rationing or credit supply has been at work
in the German banking sector recently, we will, in a first step, take a closer look at
the euro area bank lending survey for Germany which has been established at the
beginning of last year.
                                                
3  See Stiglitz, J. E., A. Weiss (1981), Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information, in:
American Economic Review 71 (3): 393-410. Also Greenwald, B., J. Stiglitz (1993), New and Old
Keynesians, in: Journal of Economic Perspectives 7, 23-44; Greenwald, B., J. Stiglitz (1993), Fi-
nancial Market Imperfections and Business Cycles, in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics 108,
75-114.Polleit: The Slowdown in German Bank Lending – Revisited
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4. German result of the euro area bank lending survey for Q3 03
In January 2003, the Eurosystem introduced a quarterly bank lending survey of the
euro area, based on a questionnaire containing 18 questions regarding past and
expected credit market developments (see Box 1).
4 The survey distinguishes be-
tween the demand-side determinants and supply-side determinants of changes in
lending, thereby ascertaining the relationship between bank lending policy and the
economic cycle. The survey shall provide the Eurosystem with better information
on banks' lending policy.
According to the results of the fourth German bank lending survey from Q3 03, the
respondent institutions in Germany continued to tighten slightly their credit stan-
dards as applied to some loans and credit lines to enterprises. This was unrelated
to the size of the enterprises or the loan maturity. Essentially, the credit institutions
again pointed to higher risk assessment as the cause, especially given the general
economic outlook and sector-specific or company-specific factors; however, the
responses suggested that, to an extent, increases in banks’ cost of capital had
also played a role. However, “the survey did not provide any indication of a credit
crunch.”
5
The trend towards a sustained broadening of margins for riskier loans continued in
all areas of credit business covered by the survey, indicating a wider risk-
                                                
4 See Deutsche Bundesbank, German result of euro area bank lending, in Monthly Bulletin June
2003, pp. 67 – 76. Also European Central Bank, A bank lending survey for the euro area, Monthly
Bulletin April 2003, pp. 65 – 69.
5 Deutsche Bundesbank, The results of euro area bank lending survey, Monthly Bulletin June 2003,
p. 76.Polleit: The Slowdown in German Bank Lending – Revisited
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differentiated spread of banks’ loan margins. During the past quarters, there was a
steady decline, however, in the tendency for the margins on average loans to
widen; in the case of housing loans, the data supplied by the banks in the third
quarter suggest that, to an extent, there was actually a narrowing of the margins
on average loans. With regard to the other lending conditions, the respondent
banks also indicated that they were applying somewhat stricter criteria to loans or
credit lines to enterprises – partly in respect of credit volume but also of collateral.
Box  1: Eurosystem bank lending survey, questions asked
1. Over the past three months, how have your bank’s credit standards as applied to the approval of loans
or credit lines to enterprises changed?
2. Over the past three months, how have the following factors affected your bank’s credit standards as
applied to the approval of loans or credit lines to enterprises (as described in question 1 in the column
headed “Overall”)?
3. Over the past three months, how have your bank’s conditions and terms for approving loans or credit
lines to enterprises changed?
4. Over the past three months, how has the demand for loans or credit lines to enterprises changed at
your bank, apart from normal seasonal fluctuations?
6. Please indicate how you expect your bank’s credit standards as applied to the approval of loans or
credit lines to enterprises to change over the next three months.
8. Over the past three months, how have your bank’s credit standards as applied to the approval of loans
to households changed?
9. Over the past three months, how have the following factors affected your bank’s credit standards as
applied to the approval of loans to households for house purchase (as escribed in question 8)?
10. Over the past three months, how have your bank’s conditions and terms for approving loans of house-
holds for house purchase changed?
11. Over the past three months, how have the following factors affected your bank’s credit tandards as
applied to the approval of consumer credit and other lending to households (as described in question
8)?
12. Over the past three months, how have your bank’s conditions and terms for approving consumer credit
and other lending to households changed?
13. Over the past three months, how has the demand for loans to households changed at your bank, apart
from normal seasonal fluctuations?
14. Over the past three months, how have the following factors affected the demand for loans to house-
holds for house purchase (as described in question 13)?
15. Over the past three months, how have the following factors affected the demand for consumer credit
and other lending to households (as described in question 13)?
16. Please indicate how you expect your bank’s credit standards as applied to the approval of loans to
households to change over the next three months.
17. Please indicate how you expect demand for loans to households to change over the next three months
at your bank (apart from normal seasonal fluctuations).
18. Over the past three months, have there been any other issues of importance for bank lending behav-
iour in the euro area or in your country which are not covered by this survey?
Source: ECB.
The survey showed a further slight decrease in loan demand from enterprises,
whereas for consumer credit the demand was unchanged and for housing loans to
households it was edging slightly upwards. According to the data supplied by thePolleit: The Slowdown in German Bank Lending – Revisited
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respondents, the main factor contributing to the further slight reduction in loan de-
mand from enterprises was lower financing needs for fixed investment, whereas
debt restructuring again generated positive demand effects.
With regard to households, uncertainty as to the future of the government grant to
home buyers among other things increased demand for housing loans. Depressed
consumer confidence was meanwhile still having a dampening effect, although this
was not as strong as it had been. Compared with the aggregate results for the
euro area, the replies from the respondent German institutions more frequently
express expectations of an increase in loan demand from both enterprises and
households in the fourth quarter. Overall, however, the German survey results
were more or less in line with the aggregate results for the euro area.
As far as actual data on bank lending costs are concerned, it has to be taken into
account that the new MFI (monetary financial institutions) interest rate statistics
have been collected in a uniform manner in all euro-area countries since January
2003 (see Box 2). The German results include data submitted by a representative
sample of around 200 banks, with all interest rates being weighted with the re-
spective lending or deposit volumes. The new MFI interest rate statistics super-
sede the Bundesbank’s statistics on lending and deposit rates, which were discon-
tinued after June 2003. The old method recorded the unweighted interest rates on
new business in standardised deposit and lending products most frequently
agreed by German banks with their retail customers. Thus, the results produced
by the two methods are extremely difficult to compare because the new MFI inter-
est rate statistics are conceptually very different from the previous statistics.
Box 2: The new MFI interest rate statistics
The German contribution to the MFI interest rate statistics covers the interest
rates applied by MFIs in Germany and the related volumes of euro-denominated
deposits and loans to households and non-finanical corporations domiciled in
the euro area. The lending and deposit categories were redefined and harmo-
nised in order to represent the new business of all euro-area banks adequately.
The MFI interest rate statistics include not only interest rates and volumes of
new business but also the corresponding data for outstanding amounts by lend-
ing and deposit category; for the latter, the end of the month is the cut-off date.
When the books are closed at the end of the month, reporting institutions calcu-
late the effective interest rates and volumes of all outstanding deposit and lend-
ing business and calculate a weighted average interest rate for each reporting
category.
Banks use two different procedures for capturing new business. In the case of
deposits with an agreed maturity and of all loans excluding overdrafts, new busi-
ness encompasses all new agreements between customers and banks. ThesePolleit: The Slowdown in German Bank Lending – Revisited
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include all financial arrangements in which terms have been agreed for the first
time in the reporting month as well as all outstanding contracts newly negotiated
with active involvement by the customers. The interest rates are calculated as
volumeweighted average rates, with account being taken of all new agreements
concluded during the reporting month. In the case of overnight deposits, depos-
its redeemable at notice and overdrafts, however, new business is collected (like
outstanding amounts) at the end of the month in question.
Effective interest rates are calculated either as annualised agreed rates or as
narrowly defined effective rates, which cover interest payments but no other re-
lated costs (such as for enquiries, administration, preparation of documents,
guarantees and credit insurance). In addition, for the overarching categories of
“consumer credit” and “housing loans” to households, the annual percentage
rate of charge as defined in Directive 87/102/EEC, which comprises the total
costs to the customer, is also to be reported.
See Deutsche Bundesbank, Monthly Bulletin November 2003, p. 27.
That said, we took a closer look at the new statistics. Figure 5 gives an overview
on effective interest rates of German bank loans (“new business”) extended to
firms (that are non-financial corporations) and the swap spreads for various vol-
umes. Even though the time period under review is rather limited, the data suggest
that borrowing costs have declined for all maturities under review in 2003. In addi-
tion, swap spread levels have also declined (presumably from an elevated level),
in line with the general market trend. This result might be somewhat surprising in
view of the latest bank lending survey results. And indeed even the Eurosystem
appears to be unsure as to what the new statistics actually suggest. One explana-
tion put forward could be that balance sheet adjustments have let to improvements
in the banks’ portfolio risk, thereby inducing a dampening effect on credit margins
for new lending. A more technical explanation might be seen in role of weights
used to calculate the average lending rates. The relative large weight of, for in-
stance, big volume low risk loans might have translated into a decline in risk pre-
miums for the average lending rate. Be that as it may, the statistics do not indicate
an undue relative credit cost increase which suggests a supply side restriction.
Given the relative short data period under review and the yet unsolved problems
with the new statistics, however, further analysis is required to answer the ques-
tion as to whether supply side restrictions are prevailant.Polleit: The Slowdown in German Bank Lending – Revisited
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Fig. 5:  Interest rates, swap spreads and volumes for German bank loans to 
non-financial corporations, January 2003 to November 2003
Other loans up to € 1.0 mn, including those with fixed maturity






































 Jan-03 6.7 96.6 5.4 2.8 8.7 5.3 1.8 1.4 5.4 1.1 1.6
 Feb-03 6.8 96.8 4.9 2.6 8.2 5.3 2.1 1.1 5.3 1.2 1.5
 Mar-03 6.8 94.1 5.0 2.6 8.7 5.3 1.9 1.5 5.3 1.1 2.6
 Apr-03 6.7 91.5 5.1 2.7 8.3 5.2 1.8 1.5 5.3 1.0 1.6
 May-03 6.6 90.3 4.8 2.7 7.6 5.1 2.1 1.2 5.2 1.3 1.7
 Jun-03 6.6 93.2 4.5 2.4 7.8 4.9 1.9 1.0 5.1 1.2 1.5
 July-03 6.5 88.2 4.4 2.2 7.9 4.9 1.3 1.8 4.9 0.6 1.6
 Aug-03 6.5 86.0 4.4 2.0 5.8 4.9 1.3 1.6 4.9 0.6 1.7
 Sep-03 6.6 88.5 4.5 2.4 7.2 5.0 1.7 1.2 5.0 0.9 1.7
 Oct-03 6.5 85.9 4.5 2.1 7.3 5.0 1.2 1.5 5.1 0.7 1.9
 Nov-03 6.4 88.3 4.5 1.9 7.0 5.2 1.3 1.2 5.0 0.4 1.2
Continued: loans to non-financial corporates
Other loans of more than € 1.0 mn with fixed maturity

































 Jan-03 4.1 1.4 42.1 4.3 0.8 3.7 5.4 1.1 4.9
 Feb-03 3.9 1.5 33.4 4.6 1.4 4.0 5.3 1.2 4.3
 Mar-03 3.9 1.5 37.8 4.9 1.5 3.3 5.3 1.1 4.6
 Apr-03 3.9 1.5 35.9 4.1 0.7 2.9 5.3 1.0 5.8
 May-03 3.6 1.5 31.6 3.8 0.8 3.6 5.2 1.3 6.2
 Jun-03 3.3 1.2 38.8 3.9 0.8 3.6 5.1 1.2 6.2
 July-03 3.3 1.1 33.1 3.9 0.3 2.9 4.9 0.6 6.3
 Aug-03 3.4 1.0 27.7 3.8 0.2 2.5 4.9 0.6 4.9
 Sep-03 3.2 1.1 34.0 3.8 0.5 3.2 5.0 0.9 4.9
 Oct-03 3.3 0.8 34.6 4.1 0.3 3.3 5.1 0.7 5.1
 Nov-03 3.2 0.6 35.6 3.9 0.0 3.7 5.0 0.4 4.4
Data source: Deutsche Bundebank; Bloomberg; own estimates. – The swap spreads were calcu-
lated by substracting the respective swap rate from the lending rate.Polleit: The Slowdown in German Bank Lending – Revisited
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5. Explaining Bank Lending in Germany
To analyse the factors responsible for the decline in German bank lending, we
made use of a model which – directly or indirectly – incorporates all supply and
demand side factors influencing bank lending. In fact, we calculated an “equilib-
rium” growth rate of real bank loans and compared it with the actual develop-
ments. Deviations between the two might then signal “irregular restrictions” on the
supply side. We applied a two-step procedure following the “error correction
model” technique in the tradition of R Engle and CWJ Granger (for further details
see the Appendix).
•  In a first step, we estimate a long-run (cointegrated) demand function for real
bank loans – that is, we establish a reliable relationship between the real stock
of bank loans on variables that can be held responsible for determining the
demand for loans (such as real GDP and interest rates).
•  In a second step, we estimate the short-run dynamics of bank lending (which
might differ from the long-run relations) for the same period, taking into account
the long-run relationship that was established between real loans and the vari-
ables determining its demand in the first step.
Figure 6 shows the regression results of the long-term bank credit demand func-
tion from Q3 81 to Q4 03. The real credit demand is a positive function of real
GDP (lnGDP) and depends negatively on the long-term interest rate (lnLR) and
the three-month money market rate (lnI3M). We have also included two dummy
variables (D902 and D911), which take the value of 1 after the second and first
quarter in 1990 and 1991, respectively, adjusting for the structural breaks in the
data related to the German reunification. A time trend for Q3 81 to Q4 90 (D8190)
is also included to account for the “kink” in the velocity of bank credit around the
beginning of the 1990s.
6
                                                
6  With inflation declining strongly in the 1980s, rising in the early 1990s and declining slowly
thereafter, the demand for nominal bank credit relative to nominal income was obviously higher
in the 1990s compared to the 1980s. This may, inter alia, have contributed to a stronger decline
in the velocity of bank credit in the 1980s compared to the 1990s.Polleit: The Slowdown in German Bank Lending – Revisited
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Figure 6: Estimating the Demand for Real Bank Loans in Germany from
Q3 81 to Q4 03
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
LNGDP 2.009709 0.063769 31.51566 0.0000
LNLR -1.980433 0.345502 -5.732038 0.0000
LNI3M -0.460467 0.167132 -2.755110 0.0072
DUM911 -0.873756 0.054590 -16.00590 0.0000
DUM902 0.071776 0.015492 4.632954 0.0000
D8190 -0.003861 0.000429 -8.991771 0.0000
C -8.489877 0.352877 -24.05906 0.0000
R-squared 0.996234  Mean dependent var 2.689842
Adjusted R-squared 0.995962  S.D. dependent var 0.293423
S.E. of regression 0.018646  Akaike info criterion -5.051789
Sum squared resid 0.028857  Schwarz criterion -4.857359
Log likelihood 234.3305  F-statistic 3659.469
Durbin-Watson stat 1.000977  Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Legend: LN = natural logarithm, GDP = real gross domestic product, LR = long-term interest rates,
I3M = 3-month interest rate (until end 1998 D-mark, thereafter euro), D = dummy variable (in this
case the dummies take account of the structural breaks in the time series related to the German
reunification. The dummies take a value of 1 as from Q1 91 and Q2 90, respectively, and zero be-
fore that), T = time trend for the period Q3 81 to Q4 90, C = constant. The residuals of the regres-
sion are stationary according to the ADF-Test. Included variables = 90.
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank; Thomson Financials; own calculations.Polleit: The Slowdown in German Bank Lending – Revisited
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Figure 7: Estimating the Change in the Growth of Real Bank Loans in Germany 
from Q1 82 to Q4 03
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D1D4LNL(-4)-
D1D4LNCPI(-4)
-0.430351 0.073990 -5.816313 0.0000
D1D4LNGDP(-1) 0.096596 0.034568 2.794388 0.0066
D1D4LNGDP(-3) 0.076154 0.018733 4.065224 0.0001
D1D4LNI3M 0.255515 0.091952 2.778796 0.0069
ECT(-2) -0.168817 0.041300 -4.087527 0.0001
D912 -0.082111 0.009208 -8.917662 0.0000
D902 0.086184 0.006768 12.73347 0.0000
D864 -0.016500 0.006935 -2.379355 0.0198
C -9.00E-05 0.000734 -0.122689 0.9027
R-squared 0.842243  Mean dependent var -0.000251
Adjusted R-squared 0.825853  S.D. dependent var 0.015842
S.E. of regression 0.006611  Akaike info criterion -7.101369
Sum squared resid 0.003365  Schwarz criterion -6.844519
Log likelihood 314.3589  F-statistic 51.38670
Durbin-Watson stat 1.762471  Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Legend: LN = natural logarithm, GDP = real gross domestic product, LR = long-term interest rates,
I3M = 3-month interest rate (until end 1998 D-mark, thereafter euro), D = dummy variables (In this
case the dummies take account of the breaks in the time series related to the German reunification.
The dummies take a value of 1 in Q2 90 and Q2 91, respectively, and zero otherwise. D864 takes
on the value of 1 in Q4 1986 and zero otherwise.), C = constant, D1 (D4) = first (fourth) difference
of the logarithm. ECT = error correction term. 90 observations. Test statistics are as follows: LM(1)
= 1.094 (0.298), LM(4) = 1.280 (0.286), ARCH(1) = 0.021 (0.883), ARCH(4) = 0.674 (0.612),
WHITE = 0.988 (0.471), JB = 5.071 (0.079), RESET(4) = 2.483 (0.051). The t ratios for the ECT
are statistically significant in view of the asymptotic critical values for the ECM test t ratio as shown
in Banerjee, A., Dolado, J. J., and Mestre, R. (1998).
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank; Thomson Financials; own calculations.Polleit: The Slowdown in German Bank Lending – Revisited
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Figuer 7 shows the results for changes in the annual growth rates for real loans
regressed on a number of contemporaneous and time-lagged variables from Q1
82 to Q4 03. The regression includes the time-lagged residuals of the regression
shown in Figure 6 – that is, the “error correction term” (ECT), which was lagged by
two quarters (-2). The coefficient of the ECT is negative, indicating that short-term
deviations from the long-term credit demand are corrected in the following periods.
The regression meets the statistical requirements and explains around 84% of the
total variance of changes in the growth rates for real bank loan demand.
Figure 8 shows the actual and estimated growth rates for real bank loans from Q1
81 to Q4 03, based on the regression shown in. The estimated growth rates track
the actual values fairly well, suggesting that the marked slowdown since the end of
1999 can be more or less explained by the long-run credit demand function – that
is, the slowdown does not suggest any “irregularities”.
Figure 8: German Bank Real Loan Expansion, Annual Growth Rates, 
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Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Thomson Financials; own calculations. The shaded area repre-
sents two standard errors of the estimate.
However, estimating the credit demand function until the end of Q4 03 could be
problematic: it might incorporate “irregularity” in the long-run demand function,
which may have occurred recently. Thus, we estimated the demand function until
the end of 1999 and, on the basis of this finding, calculated the “equilibrium”
growth rates according to the long-run credit demand function and compared
these findings with the actual development.Polleit: The Slowdown in German Bank Lending – Revisited
17
Figure 9 shows the demand function for real bank loans in Germany from Q1 81 to
Q4 99. Using this long-run equation, we calculated the demand for bank loans until
Q4 03, which would have materialised had the demand developed in line with the
factor identified in Figure 9. As Figure 10 shows, the actual stock of bank loans
has fallen below the “equilibrium” level from Q1 00, suggesting the supply of bank
loans might have been less than “equilibrium” demand.
Figure 9: Estimating the Demand for Real Bank Loans in Germany from
Q1 81 to Q4 99
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
LNGDP 2.117544 0.079243 26.72203 0.0000
LNLR -2.316360 0.317155 -7.303560 0.0000
LNI3M -0.391344 0.153249 -2.553653 0.0129
DUM911 -0.982518 0.065277 -15.05141 0.0000
DUM902 0.072633 0.014076 5.159963 0.0000
D8190 -0.004623 0.000474 -9.755339 0.0000
C -9.021586 0.426289 -21.16307 0.0000
R-squared 0.995517  Mean dependent var 2.591033
Adjusted R-squared 0.995128  S.D. dependent var 0.261720
S.E. of regression 0.018269  Akaike info criterion -5.079664
Sum squared resid 0.023029  Schwarz criterion -4.864992
Log likelihood 200.0272  F-statistic 2553.964
Durbin-Watson stat 1.470779  Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Legend: LN = natural logarithm, GDP = real gross domestic product, LR = long-term interest rates,
I3M = 3-month interest rate (until end 1998 D-mark, thereafter euro), D = dummy variable (in this
case the dummies take account of the structural breaks in the time series related to the German
reunification. The dummies take a value of 1 as from Q1 91 and Q2 90, respectively, and zero be-
fore that), time trend for the period Q1 81 to Q4 90, C = constant. The residuals of the regression
are stationary according to the ADF-Test. Included observations = 76. The residuals of the regres-
sion are stationary according to the ADF-Test.
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank; Thomson Financials; own calculations.Polleit: The Slowdown in German Bank Lending – Revisited
18
















Deviation (RS) Actual (LS) Estimated (LS)
Legend: Values in logarithms. – For the period Q1 00 to Q4 03 estimated on the basis of the long-
run demand for bank loans as shown in Figure 8. The residual is calculated as the actual stock of
bank loans minus the estimated equilibrium stock of bank loans.
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank; Thomson Financials; own calculations.
Using the long-run relationship for Q1 81 to Q4 99, we estimated a difference
equation for the period Q3 80 to Q4 03. Figure 11 shows the results. The regres-
sion meets the statistical requirements. Figure 12 shows the actual and estimated
annual growth rates for the real bank loans in Germany. As can be seen, the ac-
tual expansion of bank loans has been somewhat smaller than suggested by the
“equilibrium” rates. From Q1 00 to Q4 03, the actual expansion has been, on aver-
age, 0.6 percentage point below the equilibrium rate; this “gap” widened to 1.0
percentage points until Q2 03. So, most of the slowdown in German bank lending
appears to be due to cyclical factors, although some supply side restriction might
have played a role, albeit to a smaller extent than a simple look at the recent
growth trends in German bank loans might suggest.Polleit: The Slowdown in German Bank Lending – Revisited
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Figure 11: Estimating the Change in the Growth of Real Bank Loans in 
Germany from Q1 82 to Q4 99
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D1D4LNL(-4)-D1D4LNCPI(-4) -0.492396 0.074383 -6.619749 0.0000
D1D4LNGDP(-1) 0.114974 0.034276 3.354396 0.0014
D1D4LNGDP(-3) 0.077355 0.018229 4.243593 0.0001
D1D4LNI3M 0.247581 0.093785 2.639886 0.0104
ECT(-2) -0.193622 0.046087 -4.201204 0.0001
D912 -0.083253 0.008969 -9.282684 0.0000
D902 0.086346 0.006623 13.03801 0.0000
D864 -0.015652 0.006743 -2.321112 0.0235
C 0.000585 0.000778 0.751523 0.4551
R-squared 0.875903  Mean dependent var 0.000450
Adjusted R-squared 0.860145  S.D. dependent var 0.017144
S.E. of regression 0.006411  Akaike info criterion -7.145077
Sum squared resid 0.002590  Schwarz criterion -6.860494
Log likelihood 266.2228  F-statistic 55.58368
Durbin-Watson stat 2.002083  Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Legend: LN = natural logarithm, GDP = real gross domestic product, LR = long-term interest rates,
I3M = three month money market rate, (-1) = variable lagged by one quarter, D = dummy variable
(in this case the dummies take account of the breaks in the time series related to the German r e-
unification. The dummies take a value of 1 in Q1 91 and Q2 90, respectively, and zero otherwise),
D864 takes on 1 in 1986:4 and zero otherwise), d4 = fourth quarter change, CPI = consumer price
index, C = constant, Time = time trend. Included observations: 72. Test statistics: LM(1) = 0.358
(0.552), LM(4) = 0.811 (0.553), ARCH(1) = 0.137 (0.712), ARCH(4) = 0.609 (0.657), WHITE =
0.581 (0.860), JB = 3.127 (0.209), RESET(4) = 1.722 (0.156). The t ratios for the ECT are statisti-
cally significant in view of the asymptotic critical values for the ECM test t ratio as shown in Baner-
jee, A., Dolado, J. J., and Mestre, R. (1998).
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank; Thomson Financials; own calculations.Polleit: The Slowdown in German Bank Lending – Revisited
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Figure 12: German Bank Real Loan Expansion, Annual Growth Rates Q3 80 to Q4
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Source: Deutsche Bundesbank; Thomson Financials; Bloomberg; own calculations. The shaded
area represents two standard errors of the estimate.
In a final step we constructed a “total credit aggregate”, consisting of bank loans
extended to firms and private households plus bonds issued by German corpora-
tions. By doing so, we included the potential “substation effect”. Following the pre-
vious approach we estimated, in a first step, a long-term demand function for total
credit for the period Q1 81 to Q4 99. The results are shown in Figure 13. In a sec-
ond step, we estimated a model in first differences, taking into account the long-
run stability of the demand function for total private sector credit, and extended the
estimate to Q4 03. The results are shown in Figure 14.Polleit: The Slowdown in German Bank Lending – Revisited
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Figure 13: Estimating the Demand for Total Private Sector Credit Germany from
Q1 81 to Q4 99
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
LNGDP 2.149693 0.059108 36.36912 0.0000
LNLR -1.601174 0.321276 -4.983801 0.0000
LNI3M -0.786123 0.158349 -4.964485 0.0000
DUM911 -0.948070 0.050904 -18.62480 0.0000
DUM902 0.054140 0.014512 3.730693 0.0003
T8090 -0.004200 0.000393 -10.67413 0.0000
C -9.265081 0.325788 -28.43901 0.0000
R-squared 0.996520     Mean dependent var 2.668571
Adjusted R-squared 0.996269     S.D. dependent var 0.298756
S.E. of regression 0.018249     Akaike info criterion -5.094773
Sum squared resid 0.027643     Schwarz criterion -4.900343
Log likelihood 236.2648     F-statistic 3961.486
Durbin-Watson stat 1.225393     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Legend: LN = natural logarithm, GDP = real gross domestic product, LR = long-term interest rates,
I3M = 3-month interest rate (until end 1998 D-mark, thereafter euro), D = dummy variable (in this
case the dummies take account of the structural breaks in the time series related to the German
reunification. The dummies take a value of 1 as from Q1 91 and Q2 90, respectively, and zero be-
fore that), T = time trend for the period Q1 80 to Q4 90, C = constant. The residuals of the regres-
sion are stationary according to the ADF-Test. Included observations = 76. The residuals of the
regression are stationary according to the ADF-Test.
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank; Thomson Financials; own calculations.
Again, the specification provides statistically sufficient results. Fig. 15 shows the
actual and estimated real growth rates of total private sector credit for the period
Q1 82 to Q4 03. The shaded area represents two standard errors of the estimate.
As can be seen both time series are closely related with the actual decline in bank
loan growth rates accompanied by our estimate. In view of the previous findings,
this result supports the notion that the substitution effect of bank loans through
debt capital market instruments provides an additional useful explanation of the
decline in German bank loan growth.Polleit: The Slowdown in German Bank Lending – Revisited
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Figure 14: Estimating the Change in the Growth of Total Private Sector Credit in
Germany from Q2 81 to Q4 99
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D1D4LNL(-1)-D1D4LNCPI(-1) 0.147411 0.048675 3.044206 0.0028
D1D4LNL(-4)-D1D4LNCPI(-4) -0.221701 0.060183 -3.702896 0.0004
D1D4LNGDP(-3) 0.081439 0.019962 4.100924 0.0001
ECT(-1) -0.154111 0.044908 -3.449508 0.0010
DUM902 0.077173 0.007169 10.82075 0.0000
DUM912 -0.074512 0.008762 -8.547818 0.0000
D864 -0.023345 0.007274 -3.226117 0.0020
C -0.000242 0.000771 -0.315963 0.6496
R-squared 0.813961     Mean dependent var -0.000554
Adjusted R-squared 0.797884     S.D. dependent var 0.015674
S.E. of regression 0.007047     Akaike info criterion -6.986910
Sum squared resid 0.004022     Schwarz criterion -6.763213
Log likelihood 318.9175     F-statistic 50.62751
Durbin-Watson stat 1.733770     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Legend: LN = natural logarithm, GDP = real gross domestic product, LR = long-term interest rates,
I3M = three month money market rate, (-1) = variable lagged by one quarter, D = dummy variable
(in this case the dummies take account of the breaks in the time series related to the German r e-
unification. The dummies take a value of 1 in Q1 91 and Q2 90, respectively, and zero otherwise),
D864 takes on 1 in 1986:4 and zero otherwise), d4 = fourth quarter change, CPI = consumer price
index, C = constant, Time = time trend. Included observations: 72. Test statistics: LM(1) = 0.79
(0.38), LM(4) = 0.64 (0.63), ARCH(1) = 0.31 (0.57), ARCH(4) = 0.85 (0.49), WHITE = 0.581
(0.860), JB = 3.127 (0.209), RESET(4) = 1.722 (0.156). The t ratios for the ECT are statistically
significant in view of the asymptotic critical values for the ECM test t ratio as shown in Banerjee, A.,
Dolado, J. J., and Mestre, R. (1998).
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank; Thomson Financials; own calculations.Polleit: The Slowdown in German Bank Lending – Revisited
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Figure 15: Total Private Sector Credit Expansion, Annual Growth Rates Q2 81 
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Source: Deutsche Bundesbank; Thomson Financials; Bloomberg; own calculations. The shaded
area represents two standard errors of the estimate.
6. Summary and Outlook
Our analysis suggests that the slowdown in German bank lending is largely due to
the slowdown in economic activity rather than to supply side restrictions (such as
credit rationing). Most of the decline in real bank loan growth can be explained by
the factors incorporated in the long-run demand function for bank credit. The ex-
piry of special developments, such as the government promotion of investment in
eastern Germany or the decline in the large volume of foreign direct investment by
German enterprises (which stimulated lending in the 1990s), is also likely to be
contributing to the slowdown in credit growth.
In addition to demand side developments, banks are likely to have become more
cautious about taking additional credit risk, which should have contributed to the
slowdown in bank lending. However, our estimates suggest that supply side fac-
tors seem to be much less important for explaining the slowdown in bank loan
growth when compared to demand side developments. This conclusion seems to
be supported if the substitution of bank loans through the issuance of debt capital
market instruments is explicitly taken into account.Polleit: The Slowdown in German Bank Lending – Revisited
24
7. Appendix
7.1 “Credit Crunch” vs “Credit Rationing”
The slowdown in German bank lending might also be ascribed to supply-side re-
strictions on the part of commercial banks. An increase in bad loans, low margins
and a heightened degree of risk aversion on the part of banks’ management might
have led to banks refraining from extending additional loans to the private sector.
Such a situation is often described as a “credit crunch“ or “credit rationing”.
7 Al-
though these terms are frequently used interchangeably, the developments they
represent differ substantially in economic terms and deserve a closer look. Those
readers pressed for time can skip the following section, moving to the empirical
test procedures in “Explaining Bank Lending in Germany”.
To shed more light on the notions of credit crunch and credit rationing, Figure 4
shows a simple diagram depicting the supply of and demand for bank loans as a
function of the interest rate. The market clears in point A, where the interest rate is
i0 and the loan volume L0. In a first step, we outline a typical credit crunch. Taking
the market equilibrium as a point of reference, let us consider a case in which
banks contract their loan supply sharply (due to, for instance, an unexpected rise
in loan provisions that induces banks to reduce portfolio risk). As a result, the bank
supply curve moves to the left, with point B marking the new equilibrium. The mar-
ket clearing interest rate is i1 – which is higher than the original rate of i0 – whereas
the loan volume declines from L0 to L1. The sharp contraction in loan volume, ac-
companied by rising funding costs, is usually termed as a credit crunch.
                                                
7  See Stiglitz, J. E., A. Weiss (1981), Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information, in:
American Economic Review 71 (3): 393-410. Also Greenwald, B., J. Stiglitz (1993), New and
Old Keynesians, in: Journal of Economic Perspectives 7, 23-44; Greenwald, B., J. Stiglitz
(1993), Financial Market Imperfections and Business Cycles, in: The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 108, 75-114.Polleit: The Slowdown in German Bank Lending – Revisited
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Now let us turn to the more complex issue of credit rationing. To cut a long story
short, under a credit rationing, loan demand is not fully met by loan supply; the
interest rate does not clear the market and is not set to rise. In figure 4, this situa-
tion will arise in point C. At the interest rate of i2, the loan demand L2 is higher than
loan supply L1, so that a loan volume in the amount of L2 – L1 remains unsatisfied.
Such a situation might be temporary or persistent in nature. A temporary credit
rationing might be brought about by, for instance, a monetary policy impulse. A
lowering of interest rates might increase the demand for loans. As banks would
need time to analyse the credit quality of incoming loan applications, loan supply
may not respond immediately to the changes in the monetary environment but with
a time lag.
However, credit rationing might become persistent due to the existence of costs
that are due to “imperfect information” in loan markets. The emergence of a per-
sistent credit rationing may be explained as follows:
•  In a first step, let us assume that banks are (much) less well informed about
the probability of an investment project being successful than an investor who
seeks funds from the bank. This is an important aspect because banks’ willing-
ness to supply credit depends on both expected return and risk.
•  The interest rate charged on loans does not only affect an individual bank’s
return but also the probability of the investor defaulting on its loan. A bank has
to expect that the higher (lower) the interest rate charged, the higher (smaller)
the probability of investor default. This conclusion is based on two factors:
-  Negative selection. A rising interest rate charged on loans can be ex-
pected to lead to a deterioration of average quality of the credit port-
folio. This is because rising interest rate costs make risk averse in-Polleit: The Slowdown in German Bank Lending – Revisited
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vestors retreat from the market. In contrast, investors pursuing rela-
tively risky investment projects can be expected to continue to seek
funds from the banks.
-  Risk-incentive effect. Rising interest rate costs can be expected to in-
duce investors to pursue investment projects that are associated with
higher expected returns and thus a higher risk.
•  The interest rate charged on loans exerts counterbalanced effects on banks’
profits. On the one hand, a rising interest rate increases the expected return on
the loan. On the other hand, a rising interest rate charged should give rise to
the expectation of an increase in loans defaulting as investors chose more
risky investments.
•  If banks base their loan making decisions on a risk-return oriented calculation,
an “optimal situation” occurs in which it is no longer rationale from a bank’s
point of view to satisfy the credit demand in full even if the borrower is willing to
pay a higher interest rate. Instead, banks will choose an interest rate that opti-
mises the expected return of the loan portfolio (the “optimum interest rate”).
•  The existence of the optimum interest rate might imply a situation in which
credit rationing emerges. Banks might decide to supply loans at their individual
optimum interest rate, which does not necessarily guarantee that the loan de-
mand will be fully satisfied. If the demand for loan exceeds the supply at the
optimal interest rate, the market is said to be subject to a “credit rationing”.
To analyse whether a credit rationing or credit supply has been at work in the
German banking sector recently, we will, in a first step, take a closer look at the
euro area bank lending survey for Germany which has been established at the
beginning of last year.
7.2  Error Correction Model
Creating and estimating econometric models of German credit growth has en-
countered some methodological difficulties. Many factors have shaped lending
behaviour, such as those linked to German reunification, which, for example, are
difficult to measure empirically. Therefore, robust procedures such as Engle-
Granger were used for the econometric estimation methods because the condi-
tions necessary for using the Johansen procedure were not in place.
The basis for the estimates presented here is quarterly data, adjusted for breaks
and seasonal and calendar effects, of actual lending (deflated with the consumer
price index), real GDP and nominal capital market rates (the yield on domestic
bearer bonds outstanding).Polleit: The Slowdown in German Bank Lending – Revisited
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In our analyses, we made use of the Error Correction Model (ECM) in the tradition
of Engle-Granger (1969). In a first step, we calculated a long-run relation between
the dependent variable and the independent variable(s). In a two factor model, X is
the dependent and Y and Z represent the explanatory variables:
(1) t t t t Z Y X e g b a + + + = ,
where a, b and g are the parameters to be estimated and e is the identically normal
distributed error term. If X, Y and Z are not stationary, and if the error term
( Z Y X g b a e - - - = ) is integrated of the order null (I(0)), the variables X, Y and Z are
said to be cointegrated. Cointegration means two or more variables are on the
same “wavelength”, that is, the variables have a tendency to move together. To
put it differently, short-term deviations from, or shocks to, any equilibrium between
cointegrated variables have a tendency to correct themselves, that is they are
trending together so the system returns to equilibrium.
In a second step, the long-run relation between the cointegrated variables is incor-
porated into a (first) difference equation, which shows the short-term dynamic of
the independent variable. In such an equation, all variables are stationary and the
error term of the long-run equation (1), that is, the error correction term (ECT), is
included with a time lag:
(2)  t t t t t u ECT Z Y X + + D + D + = D -1 f g b a
Equation (2) can be estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) with the usual t
and F tests valid. If the parameter of ECT is smaller than zero, it shows that devia-
tions from the equilibrium are corrected later on with the magnitude of f indicating
the speed of adjustment.Polleit: The Slowdown in German Bank Lending – Revisited
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